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Abstract
The aim of this study is to investigate the influence of state ownership in
Saudi firms listed in the stock market. The first chapter studies the influence of
state ownership on financial constraint on investment. Some scholars believe state
ownership has a negative effect on the firm value. However, by using two measures
of financial constraint, the investment cash flow sensitivity and the Kaplan and
Zingales financial constraints index, the finding indicates that the existent of
government ownership decreases financial constraint in firms. Also, the results
show that the higher government ownership percentage the less financial constraint
in firms. The second chapter studies the influence of specific company factors and
the government ownership factor on capital structure. The finding shows that
tangibility of assets and size have a positive association with leverage. Leverage is
negatively correlated with growth and profitably. Finally, the results suggest that
government ownership affects the level of leverage negatively.
JEL Classification: G14, G11, G31, G32.
Keywords: Privatization; State ownership; Financial Constraint, Capital Structure.
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CHAPTER 1
Does Government Ownership Relax Financing Constraints on Investment?
Evidence from Saudi Arabia

1. Introduction
The opinion of those government-owned firms that have lower performance
than non-government owned firms has been believed by many scholars. The
government-owned firms are known as inefficient firms and they could perform
better if they were under private ownership. Many studies report the low
performance of state-owned firms comparing with fully private firms. Dewenter and
Malatesta (2001) show that government companies have lower net income. Alfaraih,
Alanezi, Almujamed (2012) find an adverse correlation between state ownership
and firm performance in firms listed on Kuwait stock exchange, indicating that
government ownership decreases market performance. Also, Boubakri, Guedhami,
Kwok and Saffar (2016) conclude that the higher government ownership in firms
causes poorer performance, less value, less productivity, and less risk-taking.
However, government ownership may signify to the market because it affords
firm credibility and assures investors, markets, and suppliers since the government
is willing to protect deals with these sides. Eljelly (2009) finds that governmentrelated companies in Saudi Arabia manage to generally perform better than private
companies with regard to income and operating efficiently. The reason for this
better performance is that the Saudi government manages economic development
1

by owning fully or partially major companies such as oil and petrochemical
companies.
Financial constraints have a negative effect on companies. This effect
influences the performances and values. Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010)
investigate whether corporate expenditure strategies vary conditional on the case of
financial constraint, they conclude to that throughout the credit crisis in 2008,
many firms avoid attractive projects opportunities due to the inability to externally
borrow. Cleary (1999) studies the relationship between financial status and firms
investments; he argues that firm investment decisions are directly related to
financial factors.
In this study, I would like to add to the literature by examining the influence
of government ownership on the level of financial constraints of firms in the case
where the government may have a positive effect. The aim of this research is to
examine the differences of influences of financial constraint among the Saudi listed
government-related firms and the Saudi listed private firms. Many studies have
discussed the influence of the state ownership on the level of financial constraints in
the Chinese firms such as Poncet, Steingress, and Vandenbussche (2010) and
Guariglia, Liu, and Song (2011). My study is different than previous studies in
many aspects. I emphasize the study on only the listed companies with government
ownership while the previous studies use both listed and non-listed companies. The
difference here is the influence of government ownership on the listed and nonlisted companies. In my opinion, listed companies with government ownership
2

usually are clearer and have improved corporate governance mechanisms than the
non-listed. Also, listed companies with government ownership are more open to
market scrutiny thus they are more reactive to the market environment than nonlisted companies with government ownership. Moreover, the previous studies use
only one measure of the financial constraints on the investments, which is the
investment cash flow sensitivity. Since there is no optimal measure of the financial
constraints, the previous studies need for the robustness check. In this paper, I use
two measures of the financial constraints on the investments, the investment cash
flow sensitivity and the developed Kaplan and Zengales index of the financial
constraints to study the influence of the government ownership and level of the
financial constraints. Also, I control for the effect of the Seasoned Equity Offerings
of companies. Finally, this is the first paper to study the influence of government
ownership on the level of financial constraints among Saudi companies. Since the
financial position of the Saudi government is strong, it is likely that government
ownership has a positive influence on the level of financial constraints of companies
comparing to the companies without government ownership. Also, It is expected this
positive influence increases by the increase of government ownership. This study
addresses several questions that are related to government ownership and financial
constraints.
Using data of the nonfinancial Saudi listed firms. I follow Lin and Bo (2012)
and I use two measures to measures the level of financial constraints. First, I use a
standard investment equation, which is a pool of two models, accelerator type
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investment and investment Tobin’s Q. Second, I use the developed Kaplan and
Zingales financial constraints index by Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001). The
findings support the two hypotheses, the related government firms suffer less
financial constraint than the fully privatized firms and the more government
ownership percent the less level of financial constraint in the Saudi stock market.
The results indicate that Saudi’s privatization plan is going to make an influence in
the terms of the soft budget constraints that the government-linked companies are
characterized by.
This finding of the relationship between government ownership and financial
constraints in companies can be explained as either way, it can be evidence for the
opinion of that government ownership creates value to government-linked
companies since it supports the companies by decreasing their financial constraints,
or it can be evidence for the government involvement continues to bring in soft
budget constraints to government-linked companies
This study adds to the literature of the state ownership in a different aspect,
where the state ownership affects positively companies’ values. Also, the study
contributes to the literature of financial constraints, and financial markets. Also, it
helps to give an explanation of the influence of government ownership on the firms’
values with financial constraints.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 provides a literature
review. The hypotheses of the study are presented in section 3. The data and the
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methodology are in section 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 describes the results of
the investment-cash flow sensitivity measure. Section 7 shows the KZ index and the
result. Finally, section 8 completes the study.
2. Literature Review
The effects of government ownership have been discussed as a related factor
to the efficiency. Some scholars argue that government ownership affects efficiency
negatively. Ramamurti (1987) argues that government-linked companies (GLCs)
goal is other than a wealth-maximizing goal. Krueger (1990) believes that there as a
lot of pressure on GLCs to employ politically related people while there are better
professional people who can be hired. Also, Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) say
that the government may force GLCs to hire excess employs. Another reason for the
low-efficiency performance in GLCs can be related to the bureaucratic in
management (Chang and Singh 1997). Moreover, there are no sufficient motivations
for managers to follow efficiency and profitability. However, Jones (1991) argues
that privatization delivers management of government-linked companies to clear
goals about what government policies need. Conversely, Christensen (1998) finds
that

government-owned

organizations

in

some

states

have

low-efficiency

performance even after reorganizations are announced. Micco and Panizza (2007)
study the connection between ownership in banks and performance among data of
commercial banks in 179 states. They find government-owned banks operating have
poorer income and greater expenses than the non-government-owned banks.

5

As some scholars find a negative effect of government ownership. Some
scholars support the firm out-performance with government ownership. Dewenter
and Malatesta (1997) contend that governments can monitor the GLCs chiefs better
than isolated stakeholders in non-GLCs. Chang and Singh (1997) argue that GLCs
do not always have lower efficiency than private companies.
Some scholars attempt to investigate the concept of ownership structure
effects. McGuiness and Ferguson (2005) measure two kinds of ownership structure
amongst Chinese listed corporations. They examine the influences of government
and foreign ownership on the performance of companies in China. They find that
there is a negative connection between free-float size and company performance.
Additionally, they find that foreign ownership state is not correlated with company
performance.
Some scholars claim that government ownership signifies a significant
indication to the market because it provides firm credibility and guarantees
financiers and markets, and suppliers because of the government ability to protect
dealings with them. Bourdman and Vining (1989) study ownership depends on
three groups of ownership: state-owned, non-state-owned, and mixed owned. They
find that fractional privatization is a better plan for a government that does not
want the state ownership form. Ang and Ding (2006) compare the GLCs and the
fully privatized companies in term of financial and market performance in
Singapore. The finding shows that corporate governance and the valuations in
GLCs are better and higher. Omran (2004) shows that there is no development
6

difference in performance in Egyptian non-state-owned companies and state-linked
corporations. Kole and Mulherin (1997) study the case in the United States and
Bozec (2003) in Canada find Similar results for different reasons.
The financial status of firms with the presence of financial constraints has
been investigated in many studies. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) study the
company investment choices in case of financial constraints. They classify
companies based on the cash holdings using Value Line data of 422 U.S. companies
for the period of 1970 to 1984 to analysis variances of investment behavior. They
say that companies with better cash holding ratios have higher informational
asymmetry difficulties and are expected to be cash constrained. The companies’
investments that use internal cash are more affected to variations of cash flow that
companies’ investments with great dividend firms. Following studies find similar
results. Hoshi, Kashyap and scharfstein (1991) conclude to that the expenditures of
investment in Japanese companies that are not keiretsu partners, financial
business conglomerates, are more affected to the liquidity than the corporations
that are keiretsu partners so they are supposed to have fewer financially
constrained. Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) find that companies stocks that are
traded over-the-counter, their investment is more affected to cash flow and that
have insider-trading behavior according to internal information. Similar results are
found by Schaller (1993) in Canadian companies. Whited (1992) and Bond and
Meghir (1994) use the Euler equation method to examine the first-order condition of
an intertemporal maximization. The approach is applied by using an exogenous
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constraint on external finance and examining if the constraint is required for a
specific group of corporations. They conclude to the external finance constraint to be
required for the constrained groups of companies.
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) have a different conclusion. They classify
companies based on the level of financial constraint. A corporation is categorized as
financially constrained if the price of external finance eliminates the corporation
from entering investments. Opposing to previous studies, the finding shows that the
smallest financially constrained corporations to have the highest cash flow influence
of investment. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) claim that high sensitivity cannot be
indicated as evidence of financial constraints.
Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) use an alternate method to
determent whether costly external finance influences financial policies. Instead of
concentrating on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow, they concentrate on the
cash flow sensitivity of cash. Financially constrained companies should have a
logical tendency to save cash, whereas unconstrained companies should not exhibit
this tendency. Using numerous ways for classifying companies into financially
constrained and unconstrained, the authors conclude that the cash flow sensitivity
of cash is positive for financially constrained companies and it is statistically
insignificant for financially unconstrained companies.
Almeida and Campello (2007) analyses the variance influence of asset
tangibility on the investment to cash flow sensitivity within different cases of
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financial constraints. They apply this method to a large sample of manufacturing
companies covering the period between 1985 and 2000. They find that tangibility of
asset can determine whether a company suffers from credit constraints - companies
with higher tangible assets can enjoy better access to external financial resources.
The credit multiplier has a significant influence on investment when companies
suffer from credit constraints, the sensitivities of investment-cash flow are rising in
the level of the tangibility of constrained companies' assets. However, the
sensitivities of investment-cash flow are not affected by asset tangibility if the
companies are unconstrained. Their finding supports their hypothesis of the asset
tangibility role in corporate investment under financial constraints.
Nevertheless, the literature analyses the determinants of cash holdings.
Opler et al. (1999) show that cash holdings are negatively correlated to the degree
and the availability of a bond rating. That is, corporations with a bond rating under
the investment grade and those that have no bond rating available hold more cash
than corporations that have an investment-grade bond rating. Kim, Mauer, and
Sherman (1998) and Harford (1999) report similar finding, cash holdings are
positively related to the volatility of industry cash flow. Also, the findings support
the results of Opler et al. (1999), financially constrained corporations hold more
cash than unconstrained corporations.
The influence of state ownership on the level of financial constraints has been
discussed in some studies. Poncet, Steingress, and Vandenbussche (2010)
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investigate the presence of credit constraints in Chinese firms for the period of
1998-2005. They organize the enterprises into three different enterprises
classifications based on the shareholder's types, private enterprises, SOEs, and
foreign-invested enterprises. They use cash flow as a proxy for internal finance and
they estimate every group separately. The study finds that the cash flow coefficients
are insignificant for the group of SOEs and foreign-invested enterprises while in the
group of private enterprises, the cash flow coefficient is positive and significant. The
authors conclude that SOEs and foreign-invested enterprises do not face financial
constraints while private enterprises do. Guariglia, Liu, and Song (2011) use a
dynamic assets growth model for the same enterprise's classifications obtain by
Poncet, Steingress, and Vandenbussche (2010) for the period of 2000-2007.
Guariglia, Liu, and Song (2011) use a dynamic assets growth model and cash flow
as a proxy for internal finance. The finding is similar to the results of Poncet,
Steingress, and Vandenbussche (2010), SOEs do not face financial constraints.
There are few studies have analyzed the issue of the investment behavior of
privatized former SOEs in transition economies. Lizal and Svejnar (2002) discover
that SOEs and former SOEs were less profitable and enjoyed more bank credits in
industrial companies in the Czech Republic. The findings show that during the
transition period SOEs and former SOEs invested at a greater rate than more
profitable other companies and operated under the soft budget constraint.
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Firth, Lin, and Wong (2008) study the influence of state ownership on the
monitoring and disciplinary influence of leverage on investment of Chinese
companies. The results show that the companies with a greater state ownership
ratio have a less negative correlation between leverage and investment, indicating a
less monitoring role of debt in the company with greater state ownership ratio.
Finally, these studies conclude that companies with high state ownership
ratio in transition economies still have some level of the soft budget constraint.
Nevertheless, as I discussed in section one, there are some issues with the previous
studies. First, I emphasize the study on only the listed companies with government
ownership while the previous studies use both listed and non-listed companies. The
difference here is the influence of government ownership on the listed and nonlisted companies. In my opinion, listed companies with government ownership
usually are clearer and have improved corporate governance mechanisms than the
non-listed. Also, listed companies with government ownership are more open to
market scrutiny thus they are more reactive to the market environment than nonlisted companies with government ownership. Second, the previous studies use only
one measure of the financial constraints on the investments, which is the
investment cash flow sensitivity. Since there is no optimal measure of the financial
constraints, the previous studies need for the robustness check. In this paper, I use
two measures of the financial constraints on the investments, the investment cash
flow sensitivity and the developed Kaplan and Zengales index of the financial
constraints to study the influence of the government ownership and level of the
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financial constraints. Third, I control for the effect of the Seasoned Equity Offerings
of companies.
3. Hypotheses
The fact that Saudi government financial position is strong and the
government manages the economic development by owning partially major
companies arises a question about how the government affects the financial
positions in the corporations listed in the Saudi stock market. Especially, when
considering the Saudi 2030 vision that aims to fully or partially privatize more
state-owned assets, which is going to affect the government-linked firms'
performance in the future.
The government-related companies in Saudi Arabia manage to perform
better than private companies with regard to income and operating efficiently
Eljelly (2009). Cleary (1999) finds that investments are related to direct financial
status. Taking into account these two studies, I hypotheses that government-related
firms have less financial constraints compared to private firms in Saudi Arabia.

H1: Government-related firms have less financial constraints
Gunasekarage and et al. (2007) find that state ownership has influenced on
firms performance at a high level of state ownership. Since I expect a positive
influenced of the state ownership, I hypotheses that the level of financial
constraints decreases as government ownership increases.
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H2: The level of financial constraints decreases as government ownership
increases
4. Data
The data I use in the study is quarterly and it covers nonfinancial companies
listed on the Saudi stock market for the period of 2010 to 2017. The accounting data
comes from global Campustat. Data of government ownership is hand collected.
Saudi government ownership can be in three forms, the public investments funds
(PIF), the general organization for social insurance and the public pension agency.
The total number of firms included in the study is 86 firms. The government owns
partially in 31 firms. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the full sample.
The mean average of the investment to total assets is 0.02. The mean average
of Tobin’s-Q is 1.48. The mean average of cash flow to total assets is 0.03. The
average of government ownership percentage is 0.07. The size average is 21.72. The
mean average of the sales growth is 0.02. The majority of the sample did not use
equity financing over the sample term. Finally, the average total debt to total assets
is 0.29.
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the linked government firms. Table 3
shows summary statistics for the fully privatized firms. The mean average of the
investment to total assets is about 0.02 for both subsamples. The average of Tobin’sQ is a little better for the fully privatized firms' sample. The ability to make
internal funds is slightly higher in the linked government firms. The average mean
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of government ownership is about %20 in linked government firms. The mean
average of the sales growth is little higher in linked government firms (0.03) while
for the privatized firms is only 0.02. Finally, the average of total debt to total assets
is 0.31 for the linked government firms and 0.29 for the fully privatized firms.
5. Methodology
To analysis the influence of the Saudi government on the degree of financing
constraints in companies, I follow Lin and Bo (2012) and I use a standard
investment equation, which is a pool of two models, accelerator type investment and
investment Tobin’s Q. Because the Saudi stock market is not very well developed, I
use sales growth rate and Tobin’s Q together to take into account investment
fundamentals to avoid any problems can be caused by market-based variables. The
standard investment equation is:
𝐼

[𝐾 ]

𝐼

𝑖,t

= 𝛽1 [𝐾]

𝐶𝐹

𝑖,t−1

+ 𝛽2 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 [ 𝐾 ]

𝑖,t−1

𝐷

+ 𝛽5 [𝐾]

𝑖,t−1

+ 𝛽6 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +

𝛽7 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 …(1)
I, is the investment and it is the difference between the fixed assets for the
present year and the fixed assets for the prior year adding depreciation. K is the
whole assets as a measure for the capital stock. Sale is the yearly growth ratio of
sales. Q is Tobin’s Q, indicating the firms’ investment chances and it is estimated as
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Table 1
The table shows summary statistics for quarterly data of nonfinancial companies listed in the Saudi stock
market covering the term of 2010 – 2017. Note that (I/K) is the fraction of investment to whole assets. Q is
Tobin’s Q, (CF/K) is the fraction of cash flow to whole assets. State is the percentage of shares held by the
government, Size is the natural logarithm of whole assets, Sales is the yearly growth rate of sales, Leverage is a
fraction of whole debt to whole assets and SEO is the seasoned equity offering dummy and it equals 1 if
seasoned equity offering exists.

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

(I/K)

0.018

0.078

-2.344

0.707

Q

1.484

0.650

0.792

2.799

(CF/K)

0.026

0.019

0.001

0.059

State

0.067

0.112

0.000

0.325

Size

21.737

1.131

20.185

23.676

Sales

0.024

0.193

-0.284

0.371

SEO

0.256

0.436

0.000

1.000

Leverage

0.293

0.156

0.061

0.533
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Table 2
The table shows summary statistics for quarterly data of nonfinancial government-linked companies listed in
the Saudi stock market covering the term of 2010 – 2017. Note that (I/K) is the fraction of investment to whole
assets. Q is Tobin’s Q, (CF/K) is the fraction of cash flow to whole assets. State is the percentage of shares held
by the government, Size is the natural logarithm of whole assets, Sales is the yearly growth rate of sales,
Leverage is a fraction of whole debt to whole assets and SEO is the seasoned equity offering dummy and it
equals 1 if seasoned equity offering exists.

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

(I/K)

0.021

0.060

-0.863

0.542

Q

1.456

0.612

0.792

2.799

(CF/K)

0.032

0.018

0.001

0.059

State

0.195

0.107

0.050

0.325

Size

22.505

0.932

20.185

23.676

Sales

0.029

0.177

-0.284

0.371

SEO

0.236

0.425

0.000

1.000

Leverage

0.301

0.154

0.061

0.533
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Table 3
The table shows summary statistics for quarterly data of nonfinancial fully privatized companies listed in the
Saudi stock market covering the term of 2010 – 2017. Note that (I/K) is the fraction of investment to whole
assets. Q is Tobin’s Q, (CF/K) is the fraction of cash flow to whole assets. State is the percentage of shares held
by the government, Size is the natural logarithm of whole assets, Sales is the yearly growth rate of sales,
Leverage is a fraction of whole debt to whole assets and SEO is the seasoned equity offering dummy and it
equals 1 if seasoned equity offering exists.

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

(I/K)

0.017

0.085

-2.344

0.707

Q

1.502

0.672

0.792

2.799

(CF/K)

0.023

0.018

0.001

0.059

State

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Size

21.324

1.006

20.185

23.676

Sales

0.022

0.199

-0.284

0.371

SEO

0.266

0.442

0.000

1.000

Leverage

0.289

0.156

0.061

0.533
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the total of the value of the year-end market, the book value of total debts, divided
by the year-end whole assets. Cash flow is the net income adding depreciation. The
coefficient for CF/K indicates the sensitivity of investment cash flow, which is
generally employed in the literature as an indicator of financial constraints. D/K is
the ratio of whole debt to whole assets. State is the percentage of shares held by the
government. Size is calculated by the natural logarithm of the firm’s whole assets.
To measure the influence of government ownership of the level of financial
constraint, I use a method that is similar to the method developed by Firth, Lin,
and Wong (2008). I include an interactive term of cash flow and the government
ownership to measure the influence of government ownership on the investment
cash flow effects. The interactive term is the product of the cash flow scaled by
whole assets and a dummy variable D-State that equals one if the biggest owner of
the company is the government. Also, I replace the dummy variable by the
percentage of government shares State.

𝐼

[𝐾 ]

𝐼

𝑖,t

= 𝛽1 [𝐾]

𝐶𝐹

𝑖,t−1

+ 𝛽2 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 [ 𝐾 ]

𝑖,t−1

𝐷

𝛽6 [𝐾]

𝑖,t−1

𝐶𝐹

+ 𝛽5 [[ 𝐾 ]

𝑖,t−1

× 𝐷𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 ] +

+ 𝛽7 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9 𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 …(2)

As checking for the robustness, I change the dummy variable in the
interactive term with the government ownership percentage. The new interactive
term is to analysis the influence of the amount of the percentage of stocks holds by
the government on the level of financial constraints on investment.
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+ 𝛽2 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 [ 𝐾 ]

𝐷

𝛽6 [𝐾]

𝑖,t−1

𝑖,t−1

𝐶𝐹

+ 𝛽5 [[ 𝐾 ]

𝑖,t−1

× 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 ] +

+ 𝛽7 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9 𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 …(3)

6. Main variables and interactive terms
The first measure is a combine of two models, which are accelerator type
investment and investment Tobin’s Q. Since the Saudi stock market is not very well
developed. I take into account investment fundamentals and I use sales growth rate
and Tobin’s Q together to avoid any problems can be affected by market-based
variables. Table 4 summaries the main variables used in the first measure. The
dependent variable is investment scaled by total assets, investment is calculated as
the difference between the fixed assets for the present year and the fixed assets for
the prior year plus depreciation. Total assets are calculated as the total assets. The
first independent variable is the lagged term of dependent variable to consider the
dynamic nature of investment. Second independent variable is sales. It is calculated
as the yearly growth ratio of sales and it is used to take into account the accelerator
influence. Third independent variable is Tobin’s Q. It indicates the firms’
investment chances and it is estimated as the total of the value of the year-end
market, the book value of total debts, divided by the year-end whole assets. Fourth
independent variable is the cash flow to total assets. Cash flow is the sum of net
income and depreciation. The coefficient of the cash flow to total assets indicates the
sensitivity of investment cash flow, which is generally employed in the literature as
an indicator of financial constraints. Fifth independent variable is the fraction of
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total debt to total assets and is used to control the influence of the debt on the
investment. Sixth independent variable is state. It is calculated as the percentage of
shares held by the government. Next independent variable is size and it is
generated by the natural logarithm of the firm’s whole assets. Last independent
variable is the seasonal equity offering. It is a dummy variable that takes the value
of one if a firm has SEO in a single period, and zero otherwise. It is used to capture
the effect of the SEO on investment.
To test the two hypotheses, I use a method that is similar to the method
developed by Firth, Lin, and Wong (2008). I add two interactive terms of cash flow
and the government ownership to measure the influence of government ownership
on the investment cash flow effects. The first interactive term is the product of the
cash flow scaled by total assets and a dummy variable, D-State, that takes the value
of one if the biggest owner of the company is the government, and zero otherwise.
This interactive term should tell us the type of the state influence on the level of
financial constraints in firms. The second interactive term is the product of the cash
flow scaled by total assets and the variable of State (measured as the percentage of
shares held by the government). This interactive term measures the influence of the
state ownership on financial constraint at different level of the ownership. Table 5
summaries the two interactive terms used in the first measure.
7. The results of the investment-cash flow sensitivity measure
Since the level of corporation's investment is influenced by its cash flow and
profitability, also the level of investment might affect the firm’s cash flow and
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profitability, the problem of endogeneity is probably to happen in the equation. I
employ the estimator of the Generalized Method of Moments developed by Arellano
and Bond (1991) to get the results of the three models.
Before I look at the results, I check the fitness of the model. The GMM
estimator requires no autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors. The results of
Arellano-Bond tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at first order
and second order are presented in Table 6 as m1 and m2. The p values for m1 test
in all estimations are zero so I reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in
the first-differenced errors at order one. The p values for m2 test in all estimations
are greater than 0.05 so I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second-order
autocorrelation. Therefore, The result of autocorrelation indicates that there is no
model misspecification problem for the estimations. Another important thing is to
check the validity of instruments used in the estimation by using Sargan test of
overidentifying restrictions. The result of the test presented in Table 6 and it
indicates that the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions cannot be
rejected. The results of the two tests imply that the models are correctly specified
and the instruments employed are valid.
The findings are given in Table 7. The estimated coefficients of the lagged
investment to whole assets are negative and significant for the first, second and
third models. The estimated coefficients of the sales growth are insignificant in the
three models. Tobin’s Q estimated coefficients in the three models are positive and
significant and this is stable with the Q-model of investment. The most important
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Table 4
The table describes the main variables in the study that are used in the first measure, the cash flow sensitivity
measure.

Main Variables

Description

Investment to Total
Assets

Investment is calculated as the difference between the fixed
assets for the present year and the fixed assets for the prior year
plus depreciation. Total assets are calculated as the total assets.

Sales

Sales variable is calculated as the yearly growth ratio of sales.

Tobin’s Q

Tobin’s Q is calculated as the total of the value of the year-end
market, the book value of total debts, divided by the year-end
whole assets.

Cash flow to Total
Assets

Cash flow is calculated as the net income plus depreciation. Total
assets are calculated as the total assets.

Total Debt to Total
Assets

Total debt is calculated as the sum of long-term debt plus shortterm dept. Total assets are calculated as the total assets.

State

State is the percentage of shares held by the government.

Size
SEO

Size is calculated by the natural logarithm of the firm’s total
assets.
Seasonal equity offering is a dummy variable that takes the
value of one if a firm has SEO in a single period, and zero
otherwise.

22

Table 5
The table describes the interactive terms in the study that are used in the first measure, the cash flow
sensitivity measure.

Interactive Terms

Description

First Interactive
Term

It is calculated as the product of the cash flow (scaled by total
assets) and a dummy variable D-State that equals one if the
biggest owner of the company is the government, and zero
otherwise.

Second Interactive
Term

It is calculated as the product of the cash flow (scaled by total
assets) and the variable of State (measured as the percentage of
shares held by the government).
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estimated coefficient in the first model is one of the cash flow to whole assets. It is
positive and significant which indicates the existent of the financial constraint in
the sample. The estimated coefficients of the leverage variable for the three models
are insignificant. The government ownership estimated coefficient in the first model
is insignificant however, the two coefficients of models two and three are positive
and significant which, indicates the important role in the investments. The
estimated coefficients of the natural logarithm of the size are significant and
negative in the first and third models while it is insignificant in the second model.
The estimated coefficients of the seasonal equity offering are insignificant in all
three models. The most important is the estimated coefficients of the interactive
terms of model two and three. In model two, the estimated coefficient of the
interactive term is negative and significant, which confirms the first hypothesis
that the existent of government ownership decreases the level of financial
constraint. The estimated coefficient of the interactive term in model three is
negative and significant which confirms the second hypothesis that the greater
government ownership the less level of financial constraint in firms.
The results indicate that Saudi’s privatization plan is going to make an
influence in the terms of the soft budget constraints that the government-linked
companies are characterized by. This finding of the relationship between
government ownership and financial constraints in companies can be explained as
either way, it can be evidence for the opinion of that government ownership creates
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value to government-linked companies since it supports the companies by
decreasing their financial constraints, or it can be evidence for the government
involvement continues to bring in soft budget constraints to government-linked
companies.
8. The results of the developed KZ model
The second measure is the developed Kaplan and Zingales index of financial
constraints by Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001). Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
challenged that companies facing greater investment-cash flow sensitivity cannot be
an indicator of being greater financially constrained. They test various accounting
variables and conclude that there are five important accounting variables that have
an influence on the level of the financial constraints in companies. The five
variables are cash flow, Tobin’s Q, debt, dividends and cash holdings. Lamont, Polk,
and Saa-Requejo (2001) make an indicator to proxy the degree of financial
constraints for companies by employing the estimated coefficients of the five
variables to their own sample. The construction of the KZ index is:
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 = – 1.002 [
] + 0.283 [𝑄𝑖𝑡 ] + 3.139[𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 ] – 39.368 [
] – 1.315 [
]
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
KZi,t is the Kaplan and Zingales index for each individual firm at time t, the
high the KZ index indicates high financial constraints in the corporation. CF is the
cash flow, K is the whole assets, Q is Tobin’s Q, Debt is the ratio of whole debt to
whole assets, and Cash is the liquidity. I generate the KZ index for my sample. I
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Table 6
The table reports the result of the autocorrelation test and Sargan test to see statistical fitness of the three
equations of the first model.

Tests
m1
m2
Sargan Test

(1)

(2)

(3)

-3.6819

-3.6983

-3.6814

[0.00]

[0.00]

[0.00]

1.0136

1.0157

1.0095

[0.31]

[0.30]

[0.31]

17.2

34.32

29.97

[0.71]

[0.41]

[0.34]
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Table 7
The table shows the results of models 1-3 using GMM estimator. The dependent variable is the fraction of
investment to whole assets. The p-value presented in the parentheses.

[I/K]
Sales
Q
(CF/K)
(D/K)

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.0605

-0.0598

-0.0612

[0.00]

[0.00]

[0.00]

-0.0006

-0.001

-0.0005

[0.88]

[0.81]

[0.91]

0.0099

0.0074

0.0093

[0.00]

[0.00]

[0.00]

0.1284

0.2257

0.1812

[0.02]

[0.00]

[0.00]

0.0028

-0.0042

0.0015

[0.47]

[0.79]

[0.63]
(CF/K)*Dstate

-0.4816
[0.00]

(CF/K)*State

-1.8525
[0.00]

State

0.0043
[0.36]

[0.07]

[0.00]

Size

-0.0016

0.0004

-0.0009

[0.06]

[0.63]

[0.32]

-0.0015

-0.0017

-0.0018

[0.60]

[0.55]

[0.55]

1631

1631

1631

85

85

85

SEO

Number of observations
Number of firms

0.0065
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0.0213

generate the KZ index for each corporation -quarter observation. The mean value of
the KZ index for the whole sample is 0.15. The standard deviation is 2.42.
To check if there is any relationship among the KZ index and the government
ownership, I use fixed effect estimator and I regress the KZ index on government
ownership. Additionally, I add size as a control variable because it is not included in
the structure of the index.
𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡
State is government ownership. First, I use it as a dummy that takes the
value of one when the government ownership exists and then I use it as a
percentage. Size is calculated by the natural logarithm of the firm’s whole assets.
The findings are given in Table 8. The estimated coefficient of the dummy
state is significant and negative which indicates that the existent of government
ownership decreases financial constraint in firms. This finding is constant with the
results of the first measure and confirms the first hypothesis. The estimated
coefficient of the state as a ratio of the government ownership is significant and
negative which indicates that the higher government ownership percentage the less
financial constraint in firms. This finding is constant with the findings of the first
measure and confirms the second hypothesis. The size estimated coefficients are
both significant and positive suggesting the greater size the higher financial
constraint. The results show evidence that the listed companies with government
ownership face a lower level of financial constraints. The results indicate that
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Saudi’s privatization plan (2030 vision) is going to make an influence in the terms of
the soft budget constraints that the government-linked companies are characterized
by.
9. Conclusion
The government-linked firms are known as inefficient firms and they could
perform better if they were under private ownership. Many studies report the low
performance of state-owned firms comparing with fully private firms (Dewenter and
Malatesta, 2001, Alfaraih, Alanezi, Almujamed 2012, and Boubakri, Guedhami,
Kwok and Saffar 2016). However, government ownership may signify to the market
because it affords firm credibility and assures investors, markets, and suppliers
since the government is willing to protect deals with these sides. Eljelly (2009) finds
that government-related companies in Saudi Arabia manage to generally perform
better than private companies with regard to income and operating efficiently. The
reason for this better performance is that the Saudi government manages economic
development. Financial constraints have a negative effect on companies. Campello,
Graham, and Harvey (2010) conclude to that throughout the credit crisis in 2008,
many firms avoid attractive projects opportunities due to the inability to externally
borrow. Cleary (1999) argues that firm investment decisions are directly related to
financial factors.
In this study, I add to the literature by examining the influence of
government ownership on the level of financial constraints of firms in the case
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where the government may have a positive effect. The aim of this research is to
examine the differences of influences of financial constraint among the Saudi listed
government-related firms and the Saudi listed private firms. Many studies have
discussed the influence of the state ownership on the level of financial constraints in
the Chinese firms such as Poncet, Steingress, and Vandenbussche (2010) and
Guariglia, Liu, and Song (2011). My study is different than previous studies in
many aspects. I emphasize the study on only the listed companies with government
ownership while the previous studies use both listed and non-listed companies. In
my opinion, listed companies with government ownership usually are clearer and
have improved corporate governance mechanisms than the non-listed. Moreover,
the previous studies use only one measure of the financial constraints on the
investments, which is the investment cash flow sensitivity. Since there is no
optimal measure of the financial constraints, I use two measures of the financial
constraints on the investments to study the influence of the government ownership
and level of the financial constraints. Also, I control for the effect of the Seasoned
Equity Offerings of companies. Finally, this is the first paper to study the influence
of government ownership on the level of financial constraints among Saudi
companies.
The data used in the study is quarterly and it covers nonfinancial companies
listed on the Saudi stock market for the period of 2010 to 2017. The total number of
companies included in the study is 86 companies. The government owns partially in
31 companies. I use two measures to measure the level of financial constraints.
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First, I use two standard investment equations, which is a pool of two models,
accelerator type investment and investment Tobin’s Q. Second, I use the developed
Kaplan and Zingales’s financial constraints index by Lamont, Polk, and SaaRequejo (2001). The findings support the two hypotheses, the related government
firms suffer less financial constraint than the fully privatized firms and the more
government ownership percent the less level of financial constraint in the Saudi
stock market. This positive influence can be caused by the willingness of the Saudi
government to support a company’s equity by increasing its capital.
This finding of the relationship between government ownership and financial
constraints in companies can be explained as either way, it can be evidence for the
opinion of that government ownership creates value to government-linked
companies since it supports the companies by decreasing their financial constraints,
or it can be evidence for the government involvement continues to bring in soft
budget constraints to government-linked companies
I show evidence that the listed companies with government ownership face a
lower level of financial constraints. The finding is important because it provides
evidence that having a higher ratio of government ownership decreases the level to
which the company is financially constrained. The results indicate that Saudi’s
privatization plan is going to make an influence in the terms of the soft budget
constraints that the government-linked companies are characterized by. This study
adds to the literature of the state ownership in a different aspect, where the state
ownership affects positively companies’ values. Also, the study contributes to the
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literature of financial constraints, and financial markets. Also, it helps to give an
explanation of the influence of government ownership on the firms’ values with
financial constraints.
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Table 8
The table shows the results of the developed KZ model using fixed effect estimator. The dependent variable is
the KZ index. The p-value presented in the parentheses.

(1)

State Dummy

-0.8252
[0.025]
-8.8316

State Shares Ratio
Size
Constant

Observations

[0.002]
0.9143

0.8854

[0.000]

[0.000]

-7.1653

-6.4453

[0.001]

[0.002]

1787

1787

91

91

0.0197

0.0325

Firms

R2

(2)
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CHAPTER 2
Determinants of Capital Structure and Government Ownership, Evidence
from Saudi Arabia
1. Introduction
The capital structure factors have been discussed a lot in the literature. It
began with Modigliani and Miller (1958) who argued that the capital structure is
irrelevant to firm value. But later in their study (1963) after considering the
benefits of interests paid on debts are deductible, they conclude that the optimal
capital structure is determined by the benefits of interests. Later hundreds of
papers have studied the factors of capital structure in the United State and other
countries. In this paper, I study the determinants of the capital structure of the
Saudi listed firms.
Some scholars may believe that the linked government firms have lower
profitability Dewenter and Malatesta (2001). However, government ownership may
signify to the market because it affords firm credibility and assures investors,
markets, and suppliers since the government is willing to protect deals with these
sides. Eljelly (2009) finds that government-related companies in Saudi Arabia
manage to generally perform better than private companies with regard to income
and operating efficiently. The reason for this better performance is that the Saudi
government manages economic development by owning fully or partially major
companies such as oil and petrochemical companies.
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In this paper, I test the influence of specific company factors and the
government ownership factor on the capital structure of the Saudi listed companies
covering the period of 2010 - 2017. Using three measures of leverage, whole debt to
whole assets, long-term debt to whole assets, and short-term debt to whole assets. I
follow Rajan and Zingales (1995) and I use four specific company factors, firm size,
the tangibility of assets, profitability and growth. Also, I include government
ownership as an effective factor. It is expecting that the tangibility of assets and
size have a positive association with leverage. In contrast, leverage is negatively
correlated with growth and profitably. There are few studies that determent the
capital structure of the Saudi listed firms such as (Abdullah 2001, Alzomaia 2015).
However, none of them study the effects of government ownership on the capital
structure.
Using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, the findings
show that all the three measures have the compatible results confirming the
hypotheses except the third measure where the estimated coefficient of the fixed
assets to whole assets has a negative correlation with the ratio of short-term debt to
whole assets.
The rest of the paper is structured as follow. Section 2 provides a literature
review. The determinants of leverage and the hypotheses of the study are presented
in section 3. The data and the methodology are in section 4 and 5, respectively.
Section 6 describes the findings. Section 7 concludes the study.
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2. Literature Review
2.1 Capital Structure
Two majors theories have discussed the capital structure, trade-off theory
and pecking order theory. Miller (1977) presents the trade-off theory. Since the cost
of debt is less than the cost of equity, a company can get the benefit and increases
the level of debt until it gets the optimal degree of debt. Pecking order theory is
discussed by Myers (1984). He says companies prefer financing sources in order,
internal financing first, debt second and finally financing by equity.
Many empirical studies investigate the capital structure determinants.
Warner (1977) argues the influence of bankruptcy costs in the capital structure.
Warner finds no significant evidence that the bankruptcy costs can be a
determinant factor for the capital structure. In contrast, Altman (1984) examines
predictable profits and actual profits and finds that the bankruptcy cost is not
shallow. Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) use cross-sectional, firm-specific data to
study the capital structure. The results show that the ratios of firm leverage are
correlated negatively to the volatility of earnings indicating that there is a
significant cost of financial deficit. Also, they discover a positive correlation between
leverage and non-tax shields. Crutchley and Hansen (1989) examine the equity
agency costs that happen between managers and stockholders. They find that
increases in earnings volatility have a negative influence on leverage. Similarly,
increasing discretionary expense decreases the use of debt. Furthermore, the
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findings show that the larger firm size the more debt used. Rajan and Zingales
(1995) study the determinants of the capital structure of seven countries, United
State, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and Canada. They find a
positive link among tangibility of assets and leverage. Also, they find a negative
correlation among the market to book ratio and leverage except in Italy. Moreover,
the findings show that a positive association among size and leverage except in
Germany. Finally, the authors capture a negative association among profitability
and leverage except in Germany. Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc‐Kunt, and Maksimovic
(2001) study the determinants of the capital structure of ten growing nations,
Brazil, Indi, Pakistan, Turkey, Mexico, Zimbabwe, Jordan, Korea, Thailand, and
Malaysia. They find a negative correlation between profitability and leverage.
However, the findings show a positive link between size and leverage. Also, there is
a positive link among tangibility of assets and leverage. Deesomsak, Paudyal, and
Pescetto (2004), investigate the determinants of the capital structure of companies
in four countries of the Asia Pacific countries. They find that different legal,
financial and institutional environments have an impact on the capital structure
determinants.
Gaud, Jani, Hoesli, and Bender (2005) study the factors of the capital
structure for corporations listed in the stock exchange in Switzerland. They find
that the size of corporations and the tangible assets are positively correlated to
leverage. Also, the findings show that growth and profitability are negatively
related to leverage. Frank and Goyal (2009) study the significance of many factors
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in the capital structure of publicly traded corporations in the United State. They
capture that median industry leverage, tangibility, the log of assets, and expected
inflation are positively correlated to leverage. But market‐to‐book assets percentage
and profits are negatively correlated to leverage. Also, the results show that
dividend‐paying firms have lower leverage. Cespedes, Gonzalez, and Molina (2009)
study the capital structure of companies in Latin America. The results show that
Latin American companies prefer debt to equity.
Huang and Song (2005) investigate the capital structure characteristics using
1200 Chinese-listed companies. They find that leverage is affected by firm size and
fixed assets positively while with profitability, non-debt tax shields, growth
opportunity, managerial shareholdings and correlates with industries affect
leverage negatively. State ownership is found to have no significant influence on the
leverage level. Li, ,Yue, and Zhao (2009) study the influence of ownership structure
and institutional development in debt financing of non-publicly traded Chinese
firms. They conclude that state ownership is positively related to leverage and
firms’ access to long-term debt, however, foreign ownership is negatively related to
all measures of leverage. Unexpectedly, they find that companies in better-grown
regions are correlated with less access to long-term debt, signifying the availability
of other financing resources. Also, state-owned companies’ easy access to longstanding debt is positively related to long-standing investment and negatively
related to firm performance. Finally, they find that in less grown regions non-state-
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owned companies manage to have lower total and short-term debt than their stateowned companies.
Goh, Tai, Rasli, Tan, and Zakuan (2018) study the determinants of capital
structure for listed Malaysian industrial corporations covering the period of 2011 to
the year 2014. They find that firm profitability and non-debt tax shield are
negatively associated with leverage. However, the authors find that ownership
concentration, separation of CEO-chairs, board independence, are not associated
with leverage. Also, Liquidity, firm size and asset structure are not associated with
leverage.
Fan, Titman, and Twite (2010) study the impact of the institutional
environment on capital structure in 39 developed and developing nations. The
results show that a country’s legal and tax system and the degree of corruption
describe an important part of the changing in leverage and debt maturity ratios.
The findings imply that companies in nations that are considered as more corrupt
use less equity and higher debt, whereas companies operating in nations that have
better legal systems have more equity.
2.2 Government Ownership
The connection between ownership structure and capital structure supports
the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Shleifer and
Vishny (1986) argue that external block-holders can decrease managerial
opportunism that may arise from lower direct agency disagreements between
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management and shareholders. Companies that have large external block-holdings are
probable to have greater debt.
The effects of the owners have been discussed as a related factor to the
efficiency. Some scholars argue that government ownership affects efficiency
negatively. Ramamurti (1987) argues that government-linked companies (GLCs)
goal is other than a wealth-maximizing goal. Krueger (1990) believes that there as a
lot of pressure on GLCs to employ politically related people while there are better
professional people who can be hired. Also, Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) say
that the government may force GLCs to hire excess employs. Another reason for the
low-efficiency performance in GLCs can be related to the bureaucratic in
management (Chang and Singh 1997). Moreover, there are no sufficient motivations
for managers to follow efficiency and profitability. However, Jones (1991) argues
that privatization delivers management of government-linked companies to clear
goals about what government policies need. Conversely, Christensen (1998) finds
that

government-owned

organizations

in

some

states

have

low-efficiency

performance even after reorganizations are announced. Micco and Panizza (2007)
study the connection between ownership in banks and performance among data of
commercial banks in 179 states. They find government-owned banks operating have
poorer income and greater expenses than the non-government-owned banks.
As some scholars find a negative effect of government ownership. Some
scholars support the firm out-performance with government ownership. Dewenter
and Malatesta (1997) contend that governments can monitor the GLCs chiefs better
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than isolated stakeholders in non-GLCs. Chang and Singh (1997) argue that GLCs
do not always have lower efficiency than private companies. Khwaja and Mian
(2005) categorize a company as political if its executive contributes in an election,
the authors study the level, type, and economic costs of “political rent provision”.
They find that political rents are stronger with the increase of the firm's politician,
and political rents decrease with the decreasing of the level of electoral
participation. Khwaja and Mian also find that political rents increase with the
strength of the firm's politician and whether he or his party is in power, and fall
with the degree of electoral participation in his constituency.
Some scholars claim that government ownership signifies a significant
indication to the market because it provides firm credibility and guarantees
financiers and markets, and suppliers because of the government ability to protect
dealings with them. Bourdman and Vining (1989) study ownership depends on
three groups of ownership: state-owned, non-state-owned, and mixed owned. They
find that fractional privatization is a better plan for a government that does not
want the state ownership form. Ang and Ding (2006) compare the GLCs and the
fully privatized companies in term of financial and market performance in
Singapore. The finding shows that corporate governance and the valuations in
GLCs are better and higher. Omran (2004) shows that there is no development
difference in performance in Egyptian non-state-owned companies and state-linked
corporations. Kole and Mulherin (1997) study the case in the United States and
Bozec (2003) in Canada find Similar results for different reasons.
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3. The Determinants of Leverage and Hypotheses
Harris and Raviv (1991) claim that fixed assets, growth opportunities, firm
size, and profitability affect leverage. Based on this argument, I test the four
variables. Also, I include government ownership as an effective factor. The
tangibility of assets could help as security for repayment loans. The tangibility of
assets is measured as the ratio of whole fixed assets to whole assets. The higher
ratio of tangible assets to whole assets increases the firm ability to borrow loans.
Myers (1977) claims that firms are more probably to forgo profitable projects
when they are highly leveraged. Therefore, Rajan and Zengales (1995) argue that
companies use more equity financing when they forecasting high growth in the
future. To proxy the growth, I employ the percentage of the market value of assets
to the book value of assets. The correlation between leverage and growth is
estimated to be negative.
Large companies are usually more diversified and they fail less regularly. So
size can be used as an opposite proxy of bankruptcy. Therefore, size is expected to
affect leverage positively. Size is calculated as the logarithm of sales.
The influence of profitability on leverage is still unclear. The trade-off theory
claims that the cost of debt is not more than the cost of the equity, it is less. A
company can get the benefit of the tax shield and increases the level of debt until it
receives the best level of debt. However, Pecking order theory claims that
corporations choose financing ways in order, internal financing first, debt second
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and finally financing by equity. In the case of Saudi Arabia, there is no benefit of
tax since there is no corporate tax. The profitability is estimated as the ratio of
income to whole assets. It is expecting that profitability has a negative relationship
on leverage.
Finally, government ownership has an influence on companies. The fact that
Saudi government financial position is strong and the government manages the
economic development by owning partially major companies arises a question about
how the government affects the leverage position in the corporations listed in the
Saudi stock market. The linked government corporations seem to have less
difficulty to raise their equities since the government supports them. The influence
of government ownership is expected to be negative on the leverage level.
Government ownership is measured as the ratio of shares owned by the
government. Table 8 summarizes the determinants of the leverage.
4. Data
The data I use in the study is quarterly and it covers nonfinancial
corporations listed on Saudi stock market for the term of 2010 to 2017. The
accounting data is from global Campustat. Government ownership data is hand
collected. The Saudi government ownership can be in three forms, the public
investments funds (PIF), the general organization for social insurance and the
public pension agency. The total number of firms included in the study is 86 firms.
The government owns partially in 31 firms. Table 9 presents summary statistics.
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Table 9
The table describes the determinants of leverage used in the three measures, total debt to total assets, the longterm debt to total assets, the short-term debt to total assets.

Determinants of
Leverage

Description

Tangibility of
Assets

The tangibility of assets could help as security for repayment loans.
The tangibility of assets is measured as the ratio of whole fixed assets
to whole assets.

Profitability

In the case of Saudi Arabia, there is no benefit of tax since there is no
corporate tax. Based on the trade-off theory and pecking order theory,
it is expecting that profitability has a negative relationship on
leverage. The profitability is estimated as the ratio of income to whole
assets.

Growth

Firms are more probably to forgo profitable projects when they are
highly leveraged. The correlation between leverage and growth is
estimated to be negative. Growth is calculated as the fraction of the
market value of assets to the book value of assets.

Size

Size can be used as an opposite proxy of bankruptcy so it is expected
to affect leverage positively. Size is calculated as the logarithm of
sales.

State

The linked government corporations seem to have less difficulty to
raise their equities since the government supports them. The
influence of government ownership is expected to be negative on the
leverage level. Government ownership is measured as the ratio of
shares owned by the government.
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The mean average of the whole debt to whole assets is %29. The mean
average of the long-term debt to whole assets is %18. The mean average of the
short-term debt to whole assets is %11. The mean average of the tangibility of
assets is %63. The size average is 5.17. The mean average of the return on assets is
%2. The growth rate mean average is 1.6. Finally, the average of government
ownership is %7.
5. Methodology
To investigate the effect of the factors on the level of leverage in companies, I
follow the literature and use three measures of the leverage. The first measure is
the whole debt to whole assets. The second measure is the long-term debt to whole
assets. The third measure is the short-term debt to whole assets. I follow Rajan and
Zingales (1995) and I estimate the three basic regressions and I add the stateownership as a fifth factor:
𝐷

[𝐾] = 𝛽1 [𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠]𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 [𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ]𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 [𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒]𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 [𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦]𝑖𝑡 +
𝑖𝑡

𝛽5 [𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒]𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 …(1)

[

𝐿𝑇𝐷
]
𝐾 𝑖𝑡

= 𝛽1 [𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠]𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 [𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ]𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 [𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒]𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 [𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦]𝑖𝑡 +

𝛽5 [𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒]𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡

[

𝑆𝑇𝐷
]
𝐾 𝑖𝑡

…(2)

= 𝛽1 [𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠]𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 [𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ]𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 [𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒]𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 [𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦]𝑖𝑡 +

𝛽5 [𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒]𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡

…(3)
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Table 10
The table shows summary statistics for quarterly data of nonfinancial corporations listed in the Saudi stock
market for the term of 2010 – 2017. Note that (D/K) is the fraction of whole debt to whole assets. (LD/K) is the
ratio of long-term debt to whole assets, (SD/K) is the ratio of short-term debt to whole assets. The tangibility of
assets is measured as the fraction of fixed assets to total assets. Size is calculated as the logarithm of sales.
The profitability is calculated as the fraction of income to whole assets. Growth is measured as a fraction of the
market value of assets to the book value of assets. State is the ratio of direct shareholding by the state.

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

(D/K)

0.293

0.156

0.061

0.533

(LD/K)

0.177

0.135

0.021

0.425

(SD/K)

0.109

0.101

0.010

0.311

Tangibility of Assets

0.626

0.201

0.000

0.998

Size

5.174

1.378

2.872

7.368

Profitability

0.018

0.017

-0.005

0.048

Market to Book

1.618

1.080

0.453

3.777

State

0.067

0.112

0.000

0.325
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The subscript i represents individual firms, and the subscript t represents
the current quarter. D is the total debt. K is the whole assets. The tangibility of
Assets is the fraction of fixed assets to whole assets. Growth is the fraction of the
market value of assets to the book value of assets. Size is the logarithm of sales.
Profitability is the fraction of income to whole assets. The state is the percentage of
shares owned by the government. To avoid any endogeneity between the
explanatory variables I use the estimator of developed generalized method of
moments (GMM) by Arellano and Bond (1991).
6. The results
Before I look at the results, I check the fitness of the models. The GMM
estimator requires no autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors. The results of
Arellano-Bond tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at first order
and second order are presented in Table 11 as m1 and m2 respectively for the three
models. The p values for the m1 test in all estimations are zero so I reject the null
hypothesis of no serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at order one. The p
values for the m2 test in all estimations are greater than 0.05 so I cannot reject the
null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation. Therefore, The result of
autocorrelation indicates that there is no model misspecification problem for the
three estimations. Another important thing is to check the validity of instruments
used in the estimation by using the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. The
result of the test presented in Table 11. It indicates that the null hypothesis of valid
overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected. Therefore, the results of the two
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tests of the fitness of the models imply that the models are correctly specified and
the instruments employed are valid.
The results of the first measure are presented in Table 12. The estimated
coefficient of the fixed assets to whole assets is positive but insignificant. However,
The estimated coefficient of growth is negative and significant confirming the
second hypothesis. Size estimated coefficient is positive and significant and it
confirms the third hypothesis that size is expected to affect leverage positively. The
estimated coefficient of profitability is negative and significant confirming the
fourth hypothesis that profitability affects leverage negatively. Finally, the
estimated coefficient of government ownership is negative and significant which
confirms the hypothesis that government ownership has a negative relationship
with leverage.
Table 13 presents the results of the second measure, where the dependent
variable is the ratio of the long-term debt to whole assets. The estimated coefficient
of the fixed assets to whole assets is positive but it is insignificant. The estimated
coefficient of growth is negative and significant confirming the second hypothesis.
Size estimated coefficient is positive and significant and it confirms the third
hypothesis that size is expected to affect leverage positively. The estimated
coefficient of profitability is negative and significant confirming the fourth
hypothesis that profitability affects leverage negatively. Finally, the estimated
coefficient of government ownership is negative and significant.
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Finally, Table 14 presents the results of the third measure, where the
dependent variable is the ratio of the short-term debt to whole assets. The
estimated coefficient of the fixed assets to whole assets is negative and significant.
The estimated coefficient of growth is negative and significant confirming the
second hypothesis. The estimated coefficient of size is positive and significant and it
confirms the third hypothesis that size is expected to affect leverage positively. The
estimated coefficient of profitability is negative and significant confirming the
fourth hypothesis that profitability affects leverage negatively. Finally, the
estimated coefficient of government ownership is negative and significant.
In summary, all the three measures have the compatible results confirming
the hypotheses except the third measure where the estimated coefficient of the fixed
assets to whole assets has a negative association with the ratio of short-term debt to
whole assets. Growth is negatively associated with leverage. This finding matches
the claim of Myers (1977) and Rajan and Zengales (1995) argument that firms are
more probably to forgo profitable projects when they are highly leveraged. The
profitability is negatively connected with leverage. The finding is compatible with
the pecking order system. Firm size affects leverage level positively, the larger firm
size means more diversified firm and less risk therefore, the more firm’s ability to
borrow. The results suggest that government-linked companies have less leverage
ratio comparing with the fully privatizing companies. This indicates the more
availability of alternative financial resources for the government-linked companies
in Saudi Arabia.
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7. Conclusion
The capital structure factors have been discussed heavily in the literature. It began
with Modigliani and Miller (1958) who argue that the capital structure is irrelevant
to firm value. But later in their study (1963) after considering the benefits of
interests paid on debts are deductible, they conclude that the optimal capital
structure is determined by the benefits of interests. Later hundreds of papers have
studied the factors of capital structure in the United State and other countries.
Harris and Raviv (1991) find that fixed assets, growth opportunities, firm size, and
profitability affect leverage. Some scholars may believe that the linked government
firms have lower profitability Dewenter and Malatesta (2001). However,
government ownership may signify to the market because it affords firm credibility
and assures investors, markets, and suppliers since the government is willing to
protect deals with these sides. Eljelly (2009) finds that government-related
companies in Saudi Arabia manage to generally perform better than private
companies with regard to income and operating efficiently.
Based on the previous argument, I follow Rajan and Zingales (1995) and I
investigate the influences of the four variables. Also, I include government
ownership as an effective factor. The tangibility of assets could help as security for
repayment loans. Myers (1977) claims that firms are more probably to forgo
profitable projects when they are highly leveraged. Therefore, Rajan and Zengales
(1995) argue that companies use more equity financing when they forecasting high
growth in the future. Large companies are usually more diversified and they fail
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less regularly. So size can be used as an opposite proxy of bankruptcy. In the case of
Saudi Arabia, there is no benefit of tax since there is no corporate tax. Based on the
trade-off theory and pecking order theory, it is expecting that profitability has a
negative relationship on leverage. Finally, The linked government corporations
seem to have less difficulty to raise their equities since Saudi government supports
them. The influence of government ownership is expected to be negative on the
leverage level.
The data I use in the study is quarterly and it covers nonfinancial
corporations listed on Saudi stock market for the term of 2010 to 2017. I follow the
literature and use three measures of leverage, total debt to total assets, long-term
debt to total assets, and short-term debt to total assets. I follow Rajan and Zingales
(1995) and I use four specific company factors, firm size, the tangibility of assets,
profitability and growth. Also, I include government ownership as an effective
factor.
Using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, the findings
show that all the three measures have the compatible results confirming the
hypotheses except the third measure where the estimated coefficient of the fixed
assets to whole assets has a negative correlation with the ratio of short-term debt to
whole assets. Growth is negatively associated with leverage. This finding matches
the claim of Myers (1977) and Rajan and Zengales (1995) argument that firms are
more probably to forgo profitable projects when they are highly leveraged. The
profitability is negatively connected with leverage. The finding is compatible with
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the pecking order theory. Firm size affects leverage level positively, the larger firm
size means more diversified firm and less risk therefore, the more firm’s ability to
borrow. The results suggest that government-linked companies have less leverage
ratio comparing with the fully privatizing companies. This indicates the more
availability of alternative financial resources for the government-linked companies
in Saudi Arabia. This is the first study that investigates the influence of
government ownership on the capital structure in Saudi Arabia.
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Table 11
The table reports the result of the autocorrelation test and Sargan test to see statistical fitness of the three
models.

Tests
m1
m2
Sargan Test

(1)

(2)

(3)

-2.9847
[0.00]
1.0168
[0.31]
18.2
[0.71]

-4.8113
[0.00]
1.2865
[0.19]
15.6
[0.75]

-4.7143
[0.00]
1.0601
[0.29]
11.6
[0.78]
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Table 12
The table shows the findings of models 1 using GMM estimator. The dependent variable is the fraction of the
whole debt to whole assets. The p-value presented in the parentheses.

(1)

Tangibility of Assets

0.0056
[0.17]

Growth

-0.0125
[0.00]

Size

0.0102
[0.00]

Profitability

-0.4554
[0.00]

State

-0.0342
[0.00]

Number of observations

1562

Number of firms

84
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Table 13
The table shows the findings of models 2 using GMM estimator. The dependent variable is the fraction of longterm debt to whole assets. The p-value presented in the parentheses.

(2)

Tangibility of Assets

0.0635
[0.00]

Growth

-0.0067
[0.00]

Size

0.0068
[0.00]

Profitability

-0.3073
[0.00]

State

-0.0081
[0.03]

Number of observations

1706

Number of firms

85
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Table 14
The table shows the findings of models 3 using GMM estimator. The dependent variable is the fraction of shortterm debt to whole assets. The p-value presented in the parentheses.

(3)

Tangibility of Assets

-0.0778
[0.00]

Growth

-0.0048
[0.00]

Size

0.0021
[0.00]

Profitability

-0.348
[0.00]

State

-0.0282
[0.00]

Number of observations

1710

Number of firms

87
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